Abstract. We show that competitive equilibria in a range of useful production chain models can be recovered as the solutions to a class of dynamic programming problems. Bringing dynamic programming to bear on the equilibrium structure of production chains adds analytical power and opens new avenues for computation. In addition, the dynamic programming problem that we use to explore production chains is of interest in its own right, since it provides new optimality results for intertemporal choice in an empirically relevant setting.
Introduction
The firm size distribution and the concentration of industries within sectors of economic activity are correlated with key measures of economic performance and welfare, such as innovation, productivity, volatility of output and labor's share of income. In the past and once again in recent years, an increase in the level of industry concentration across a range of sectors has provoked both political controversy and a search by economists for sharper models of firm size within and across industries.
Internally consistent models of firm size date back to Coase (1937) , who argued that, since market-based purchases from suppliers can be substituted for in-house operations, the size of business firms in free market economies must be determined by a choice of scale that equalizes the marginal cost of these two alternatives. While debate about the nature of internal and external production costs and their microfoundations has been extensive, the principle that profit maximizing firms should equalize the associated marginal costs remains a natural benchmark and a common way for economists to communicate and organize ideas (see, e.g., Varian (2002) ).
Aside from the size of individual firms, the Coasian framework can also be used to address the macroscopic issues discussed in the introduction, such as the size distribution of firms, or other related phenomena such as the structure of production across international borders. This is done by embedding the framework into larger equilibrium models with a richer set of features. One example is Fally and Hillberry (2018) , in which firms trade-off coordination costs within the firm against transaction costs outside the firm. Fally and Hillberry (2018) use this approach to shed new light on the structure of international supply chains. Another study using the Coasian framework is Kikuchi et al. (2018) , where firms in a production chain equalize the marginal costs of in-house and external operations. The authors use this model to analyze the relationship between downstreamness and firm size.
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The purpose of our paper is to show that competitive equilibria in a range of production chain models, including those listed above, can be recovered as the solution to a dynamic programming problem. This observation is nontrivial because the production chain models in question are not dynamic and firm choices are decentralized. The conversion to a dynamic programming problem requires a reinterpretation whereby activities of individual firms are mapped to units of time. Another reason the connection between competitive equilibria and dynamic programming is nontrivial in the settings we consider is because transaction costs are admitted. The standard link between competitive equilibria and optimality breaks down in the presence of transaction costs. We recover this link via the reinterpretation described above combined with a modification of the objective function in the planner's problem that incorporates transaction costs.
This exercise as several benefits. One is that the dynamic programming problem that we are led to through this process is of interest in its own right, since it provides a foundation for the theory of choice in a commonly observed dynamic setting (negative discounting) where traditional optimization methods are problematic (see below for more discussion). A second more obvious benefit is that dynamic programming theory can be brought to bear on the theory of the firm and the structure of production chains, supplying both analytical and computational methods.
We use these ideas to analyze a range of economic problems related to production chains. We re-examine the equilibrium problems in Fally and Hillberry (2018) and Kikuchi et al. (2018) , in each case using dynamic programming methods to recover and characterize the equilibrium. This allows us to generate sharper results under weaker conditions. We also consider the production chain models of Levine (2012) and Costinot et al. (2013) , where failures in production or costly transportation inhibit specialization. We show below that the core ideas can be analyzed via our framework. We illustrate the fact that, while failures do inhibit specialization, their cost is substantially mitigated in equilibrium by endogenous adjustment of the production chain.
Negative Discount Dynamic Programming. The dynamic programming problem that we use to study production chains has an interpretation that is entirely independent of production and, at the same time, of significant interest in its own right. It involves an agent who (i) seeks to minimize the present value of a sequence of losses over an infinite horizon, and (ii) assigns future losses greater weight than current losses. In other words, the subjective discount rate is negative.
More precisely, we consider an agent who exerts effort a t 0 in period t, yielding loss with time zero value β t ℓ(a t ). Here ℓ is an increasing convex loss function and β > 1.
The actions are assumed to be unavoidable, a requirement we enforce with a forward looking constraint. This is a kind of "inverse cake eating problem," where convexity of ℓ encourages the agent to smooth effort over time, while β > 1 encourages the agent to finish as soon as possible. The agent must trade off these competing forces in order to minimize her loss.
This dynamic programming problem stands outside the conventional framework, where present values of benefit and cost flows are calculated with a positive rate of discount (corresponding, in the discrete time setting, to a discount factor β that is strictly less than one). Nevertheless, this problem is of significant independent interest. While the positive discount setting is common because it is both consistent with most observed behaviour and mathematically convenient, behavior consistent with positive discounting is not universal. Individuals apply different discount rates to different decision problems at different times, depending on the nature of rewards or losses and how the choice problem is framed. 5 Moreover, for some choice problems, future losses or future gains are given greater weight than current ones. In other words, discount rates are negative. Thaler (1981) , Loewenstein (1987) , Horowitz (1988) , Loewenstein and Thaler (1989) Loewenstein and Prelec (1991) , Loewenstein and Sicherman (1991) and Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) all document separate instances of this one phenomenon.
In fact, the range of choice problems when negative discounting has been observed is surprisingly wide. For example, in an analysis of income path preferences, Loewenstein and Sicherman (1991) found that the majority of surveyed workers reported a preference for increasing wage profiles over decreasing ones, even when it was pointed out that the latter could be used to construct a dominating consumption sequence. Loewenstein and Prelec (1991) obtained similar results. In summarizing their study, they argue that, in the context of the choice problems they examined, "sequences of outcomes that decline in value are greatly disliked, indicating a negative rate of time preference" (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1991, p. 351) .
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Two findings reported in the literature are worth noting here. First, people regularly exhibit negative discounting when presented with the time allocation of tasks that generate disutility, such as arduous, unpleasant or uncomfortable experiences (Loewenstein (1987 ), Horowitz (1988 ). 7 Second, long sequences are often associated with negative discounting. For example, (Frederick et al., 2002, p. 363) find that positive discounting is typical when the choice is between two outcomes, while preferences over sequences of outcomes "has generally found that people prefer improving sequences to declining sequences." The negative discount dynamic programming problem we consider in this paper fits into this empirically relevant setting: Minimizing loss through a sequence of choices over an infinite horizon with a negative discount rate.
In terms of optimization theory, infinite sequences of payoffs at negative discount rates can cause substantial difficulties. For example, in discrete time infinite horizon models, where the choice problem is represented as a dynamic program and rewards are bounded, the Bellman operator satisfies the conditions of Banach's contraction mapping theorem if and only if the discount factor is less than one (see, e.g., Stokey and Lucas (1989) or Bertsekas (2017) ). This contractive property is, in turn, central to the theory of infinite horizon dynamic programming in the benchmark case (see, e.g., Bellman (1957) , Blackwell (1965) or Bertsekas (2017) ). In contrast, if we take the discount rate to be negative, then the discount factor is greater than one and the contraction-based theory then breaks down. No general theory is available in the literature for this class of problems.
In response, this paper treats the intertemporal choice problem with negative discounting described above and provides a comprehensive optimality theory. In particular, we establish existence and uniqueness of the minimizing sequence, along with (a) necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality in the form of first order and envelope conditions, (b) results on the properties of the optimizing sequence, such as monotonicity, (c) necessary and sufficient conditions for the task to be completed in finite time, (d) a recursive view, where we verify validity of the Bellman equation, convergence of the Bellman operator and optimality of the policy computed from the value function using monotone concave operator theory, and (e) a set of analogous results for the continuous time setting.
These results make it straightforward to calculate the solution analytically when possible, as well as to compute the value function and solve for the optimal sequence numerically when no analytical solution exists. We note, however, that the arguments are different to the classical case and certain caveats apply. For example, to calculate the value function, one cannot simply iterate with the Bellman operator on an arbitrary continuous bounded function and wait for convergence to the value function. In fact such sequences typically explode. If, however, the initial condition is chosen from within a certain class of functions defined in the paper, then uniform convergence to the value function is guaranteed and, for a large class of problems, complete convergence occurs in finite time.
Other Related Literature. Prior to this study, there have been several examples of dynamic programming being used to study economic outcomes in non-dynamic settings. One is Hsu et al. (2014) , who analyze central place theory via a dynamic programming formulation of city hierarchy. As in this paper, not only is the solution recoverable by a dynamic program, but, in addition, this solution can be obtained by iterating with what amounts to the Bellman operator of the programming problem. While the study of Hsu et al. (2014) bears this similarity to ours, the dynamic programs and the target models are structurally and economically different.
On a technical level, our optimality theory is related to other studies of dynamic programming where the Bellman operator fails to be a contraction. Important recent contributions include Rincón-Zapatero and Rodríguez-Palmero (2003) and Martins-da Rocha and Vailakis (2010) , who replace global contractivity with a form of local contraction. Another approach is found in Kamihigashi (2014) and Kamihigashi et al. (2015) , where topological structure is omitted and analysis of the Bellman equation and its connection to optimality are based on order theoretic techniques. Our methods are different again. This is due to the fact that the dynamic program we consider is relatively specialized, allow us to provide direct proofs that use no elaborate fixed point theory.
Outline. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the negative discount dynamic program in discrete time and discuss its solution. In Section 3, we connect this discussion to Coase's theory of the firm. In Section 4 we consider the negative discount dynamic program in continuous time.
In Section 4, we show how the continuous time dynamic program also connects to Coase's theory of the firm. Section 5 describes an extension to finite horizons. Proofs are all deferred to the appendix.
Negative Discount DP: Discrete Time Theory
We now state the optimization problem discussed above in the introduction. After solving it, we will show how to connect it to the sequential production problems with diminishing returns to management and transaction costs.
2.1. Problem Statement. Consider an agent who takes action a t 0 in period t, involving loss or disutility with current value ℓ(a t ). These actions are assumed to be unavoidable, which we enforce by requiring that constantx. Here and below, a real sequence {a t } is called feasible if it satisfies this constraint and nonnegativity. Over an infinite horizon, the optimization problem can be expressed as
subject to feasibility. Regarding the primitives β and ℓ, we assume throughout that Assumption 2.1. The constant β satisfies β > 1, while ℓ : Ê + → Ê + is continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly convex and satisfies ℓ(0) = 0.
Because ℓ is increasing and strictly convex, the agent will generally prefer to smooth his or her effort over multiple periods. On the other hand, since β > 1, the agent prefers to finish the task rather than delay, and effort will be weighted towards present rather than future. This trade-off is at the heart of the optimization problem.
The assumption ℓ(0) = 0 cannot be weakened, since ℓ(0) > 0 implies that the objective function is infinite. Conversely, with the assumption ℓ(0) = 0, minimal loss is always finite. Indeed, by choosing the feasible action path a 0 =x and a t = 0 for all t 1, we get
. Also, given our other assumptions, there is no need to consider the case β 1 because no solution exists. 8 Finally, we exclude linear loss because the linear case is trivial: the optimal choice is to do everything in the first period. The same reasoning applies if ℓ is concave.
We can express the problem recursively by introducing a state process {x t } that starts atx and tracks the amount of tasks remaining. Then, we rewrite the feasibility constraint as
It is straightforward to check that, givenx, the set of feasible sequences is identical to the set of sequences {a t } satisfying (1).
Finally, let
8 Because we are minimizing loss, when β < 1 any proposed solution {a t } can be strictly improved by shifting it one step into the future (set a ′ 0 = 0 and a ′ t+1 = a t for all t 0). Furthermore, if β = 1, and a solution {a t } exists, then the increments {a t } must converge to zero, and hence there exists a pair a T and a T +1 with a T > a T +1 . Since ℓ is strictly convex, the objective t ℓ(a t ) can be reduced by redistributing a small amount ǫ from a T to a T +1 . This contradicts optimality.
We call F the value function. Intuitively, F (x) is the cost-to-go from state x, given that the agent behaves optimally.
2.2. A Recursive Solution. Consider the Bellman equation
Here f (x) ∈ Ê + is thought of as representing minimum "cost-to-go" if the agent acts optimally from state x. The right hand side of (3) captures the trade off between current loss and future loss discounted at a negative rate of time preference. Denote by T the Bellman operator corresponding to (3). For any continuous f : Ê + → Ê + , the operator T satisfies
While (3) appears at first glance to be a standard Bellman equation, T is not a contraction with respect to any obvious metric because β > 1. 9 One consequence is that, if we take an arbitrary continuous bounded function and iterate with T , the sequence typically diverges. For example, if f ≡ 1, then, T n f ≡ β n , which diverges to +∞.
Nonetheless, it turns out that the Bellman operator is well behaved, possessing properties similar to those found in standard dynamic programming problems, if we restrict its domain to a certain class of candidate solutions. In particular, let F be the set of increasing, convex and continuous functions f :
ℓ(x) for all x ∈ Ê + . In addition, let η be the unique constant defined by
existence of which follows from continuity of ℓ ′ . 2. For all k ∈ AE and all f ∈ F , we have
In particular,
3. The function π defined by
is well-defined, Lipschitz continuous and increasing.
4. The value function F is strictly convex, strictly increasing and continuously differentiable on (0,x), with
5. The sequence of actions {a * t } defined by a * t = π(x t ) with
is the unique solution to (ML).
6. The optimal sequence {a * t } is decreasing and satisfies
Moreover, {a * t } is the only nonnegative feasible sequence that satisfies this restriction.
Some of these are relatively familiar dynamic programming results, although the proofs are different due to lack of contractivity. One unusual result is part 2 of the theorem, which indicates an unusually strong form of convergence for the Bellman operator: uniform convergence in finite time. In particular, for k x/η we have
Notice that this boundx/η is independent of the initial condition f . Equation (7) is akin to an Euler equation with a possibly binding constraint. The monotonicity result in part 6 is unsurprising: future losses are given greater weight than current losses, and hence {a * t } is chosen to be monotonically declining over time.
2.3. Zero Marginal Loss at the Origin. What of the case ℓ ′ (0) = 0? Although the Bellman operator no longer converges in finitely many steps, the problem is in other ways simpler because the agent never finishes the task in finite time, smoothing away the corner solution. Because of this, the following optimality result can be established through elementary arguments. 
This sequence is unique, decreasing, and satisfies a * t > 0 for all t.
Combining Theorem 2.1 and 2.2, we see that the set of tasks will be completed in finite time if and only if ℓ
In practice the case ℓ ′ (0) = 0 is relatively simple, and typically yields an analytical solution. The next example illustrates.
Example 2.1. Let ℓ(x) = κx γ with κ > 0 and γ > 1. Let β > 1 be given.
Evidently Assumption 2.1 holds. Since ℓ ′ (0) = 0, the Euler equality (8) applies, yielding a t+1 = θa t for all t 0 when θ := β 1/(1−γ) . Since β, γ > 1 we have
This is the optimal action path for the agent. Substituting this path into (2), the value function is seen to be
As anticipated by the theory, F is strictly increasing and strictly convex.
Applications of the Discrete Time Theory
The dynamic programming problem treated in Section 2 was motivated by intertemporal choice with a negative discount rate. How does this dynamic programming problem connects to Coase's theory of the firm?
To illustrate the connection, we first consider a version of a Coasian model found in Kikuchi et al. (2018) that adopts their framework but weakens their assumptions on the cost function for individual firms. Next, we add in a more detailed production technology, which leads to sharper predictions that the original model. Throughout, the primary focus is on how the competitive equilibrium that determines the size of each firm can be calculated using dynamic programming.
3.1. A Coasian Production Chain. Coase argued that, on one hand, in-house production becomes expensive as the range and scale of operations increase, due to spreading layers of management and bureaucratic inefficiencies. 10 On the other hand, free market purchases from suppliers attract transaction costs. Equalizing the marginal costs of in-house and market-based operations requires confronting the trade-off between these forces: "diminishing returns to management" inside the firm and transaction costs outside the firm.
We formalize these ideas in the same manner as Kikuchi et al. (2018) . We consider a large and competitive market with many price-taking firms, each of which is either inactive or involved in the production of a single good. To produce of one unit of this good requires implementation of a range of tasks, modeled as a continuum and indexed by s ∈ [0, 1]. A production chain is a finite collection of firms that, collectively, implements all of these tasks and produces the final good. Firms face no fixed costs or barriers to entry.
Let c(v) be the cost for any one firm of implementing an interval of tasks with length v. As in Kikuchi et al. (2018) , we assume that c is increasing, strictly convex, continuously differentiable and satisfies c(0) = 0. At the same time, we drop their assumption that c ′ (0) > 0. The strict convexity of c corresponds to diminishing returns to management.
Transaction costs are a wedge between price paid by the buyer and payment received by the seller. 11 The share of transaction costs paid by each party matters little for our purposes, so, for convenience, we assume that the transaction cost falls entirely on the buyers. In particular, when a transaction occurs with face value f , the seller receives f and the buyer pays (1 + τ )f , where τ > 0 parameterizes the transaction costs in this market. For example, τ f might be the cost of writing a contract for a transaction with face value f . This cost rises in f because more expensive transactions merit more careful contracts. (There are, of course, many other possible interpretations for τ , some of which are touched on below.) 3.1.1. Equilibrium. Firms are indexed by integers i 0. An allocation of tasks across firms is a nonnegative sequence v = {v i } with i 0 v i = 1. For convenience, we always identify firm 0 with the most downstream firm, firm 1 with the second most downstream firm, and so on. (This is just a labeling convention.) Let b i be the downstream boundary of firm i, so that b 0 = 1 and b i = b i−1 − v i−1 for all i. As transaction costs are incurred only by the buyer, profits of the i-th firm are
Here p is a price function, which is a map from [0, 1] to Ê + , with p(t) interpreted as the price of the good at processing stage t.
Definition 3.1. Given a price function p and a feasible allocation v = {v i }, and let {π i } be corresponding profits, as defined in (10). The pair (p, v) is called an equilibrium for the production chain if Condition 1 rules out profits for suppliers of initial inputs, which are assumed for convenience to have zero cost of production. Condition 2 ensures that no firm in the production chain has an incentive to deviate, and that inactive firms cannot enter and extract positive profits. Condition 3 requires that active firms make zero profits, due to free entry and an infinite fringe of potential competitors. (Profits are never negative in equilibrium because firms can freely exit.) 3.1.2. Solution by Dynamic Programming. Consider a version of the dynamic programming problem described in Section 2, where a (fictitious) agent seeks to minimize t 0 (1 + τ ) t c(a t ) subject to t 0 a t = 1. In other words, we specialize the problem to one wherex = 1, ℓ = c and β = 1 + τ . Since Assumption 2.1 is satisfied, we know that there exists a unique solution a * := {a * i }. Let F be the corresponding value function. The next result tells us that the solution to this dynamic program is precisely the competitive equilibrium of the Coasian production chain described in Section 3.1.
Proposition 3.1. The pair (F, a * ) is an equilibrium for the production chain.
One immediate insight from this result is as follows: We know from Theorem 2.1, Part 4, that the price function is continuously differentiable on (0, 1) and, for firm with downstream boundary b i ,
Since a * i is the optimal range of tasks implemented in-house by firm i in equilibrium, this is an expression of Coase's key idea: that the size of the firm is determined as the scale that equalizes the marginal cost of in-house and market-based production.
Another implication of Theorems 2.1-2.2 is that {a * i } is decreasing. In other words, firm size increases with downstreamness. This generalizes a finding along the same lines from Kikuchi et al. (2018) .
3.1.3. An Example with Closed Form Solution. As a simple example with closed form solutions, suppose that the range of tasks v implemented by a given firm satisfies v = f (k, n), where k is capital and n is labor. Given rental rate r and wage rate w, the cost function is c(v) := min k,n {rk + wn} subject to f (k, n) v. Let us suppose further that, as in Lucas (1978) , the production function has the form φ(g(k, n)), where g is constant returns to scale and φ is increasing and strictly concave, with the latter property to due to "span-of-control" costs. To generate the closed-form solution, we take
with 0 < α, η < 1. The resulting cost function has the form c(v) = κv 1/η , where κ is a positive constant.
As in Section 3.1.2, we can solve this by dynamic programming, setting c = ℓ and β = 1 + τ . Then, by Proposition 3.1, the optimal action path for the fictitious agent corresponds to the equilibrium production chain for firms, and the value function is the equilibrium price function. Since c = ℓ has the same form as the loss function in Example 2.1, we know that the equilibrium is the allocation-price pair (v, p * ) defined by
where
Although this example lies outside the framework of Kikuchi et al. (2018) , since c ′ (0) = 0, we replicate their result that the size of firms increases from upstream to downstream (recalling that larger i corresponds to further upstream). In this particular case, the growth rate of firms as we move downstream is constant. We also see that the price function is strictly convex due to the costly span of control. Intuitively, span-of-control costs at the firm level cannot be eliminated in aggregate due to transaction costs, which force firms to maintain a certain size. This leads to strict convexity of prices in s, which might be understood as the complexity of the product. If the span-of-control cost is removed, by setting η = 1, then the price function becomes linear.
3.2. Specialization and Failure Probabilities. It is possible to give alternative interpretations of the model above. For example, consider the studies of specialization and failure probabilities found in, among others, the O-ring theory of economic development by Kremer (1993) and the production chain models of Levine (2012) and Costinot et al. (2013) . For example, the key idea in Kremer's O-ring theory of economic development (Kremer, 1993) is that production processes consist of a series of complementary tasks, and mistakes in any of the tasks can dramatically reduce the product's value. To mitigate this exponential impact on the product's value, Kremer's model has an assortative matching of workers who have different probabilities of making mistakes and the length of production chains (number of tasks) adjusts accordingly. For example, high failure workers are grouped together and build a shorter production chain. The models of Levine (2012) and Costinot et al. (2013) have similar features, where equilibrium allocations serve to mitigate the potentially exponential cost of failures in long production chains.
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A similar analysis can be derived from the model of production chains explored in Section 3.1 under a suitable modification. To see this, consider, as before, a large competitive market where producers implement a sequence of tasks indexed by s ∈ [0, 1]. We remove the assumption of positive transaction costs, which corresponds to τ = 0 in our previous notation. Instead, the friction between firms is due to positive probability of defects. Defects can alternatively be understood as iceberg costs, where some percentage of goods are lost in transporting them from one producer to 12 In Levine (2012) , long chains involve a high degree of specialization and produce a large quantity of output but are also more prone to failure. However, chains in his model are long only if the failure rate is low thus mitigating the exponential impact that production failure of a single link has on output. Similarly, Costinot et al. (2013) , in a global supply chain model where production of the final goods is sequential and subject ot mistakes, shows that countries with lower probabilities of making mistakes specialize in later stages of production.
the next. This implies that producer who buys at stage t and sells at s > t must buy β > 1 units of the partially completed good at t to sell one unit of the processed good at s. Profits for such a firm when confronting price function p are
This parallels the profit function (10) from the Coasian case and the rest of the analysis is essentially identical. In particular, if we assume the Cobb-Douglass production technology from Section 3.1.3, then (13) is valid with θ = β η/(η−1) . The price of the final good is therefore
Note that a rise in the failure probability 1 − 1/β leads to only a moderate increase in the final good price. This is because producers increase their range of production to mitigate the rise in cost associated with a higher production failure of upstream producers. As a result, there are fewer producers in production chains and the compounding effect of higher production failures is limited.
It is interesting to compare this with a hypothetical model where producers do not adjust their production according to failure probabilities. Suppose in particular that production chains are simply divided into equal tasks by N producers. In this case, the final good price iŝ
Now a small increase in the failure probability increases the final good price exponentially. This is intuitive, as an increase in cost compounds over all producers involved in the production chain.
Thus, returning to the original model, we see that equilibrium prices induce producers to adjust to changes in failure probabilities, which optimally mitigates the potentially exponential impact of failures on the cost of the final good. While this discussion is only suggestive, it does show that the ideas in Kremer (1993) , Levine (2012) and Costinot et al. (2013) are, like those of Coase, amenable to analysis using negative discount dynamic programming theory.
Continuous Time: Theory and Applications
In this section, we give a set of results for dynamic optimization in continuous time that parallel the discrete time results in Section 2. We begin with optimality results and then proceed to show how such results can be connected to production chains and the theory of the firm.
4.1. An Infinite Horizon Problem. As before, consider an agent who takes actions to complete a task and tries to minimize the total loss from her actions. The continuous time version of problem (ML) is
subject to feasibility of a(t). Now feasibility means that a is a nonnegative real function on Ê + , with at most finitely many points of discontinuity, and satisfying
Assumption 4.1. The constant ρ is strictly positive, while ℓ : Ê + → Ê + is continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly convex and satisfies ℓ(0) = 0.
Positivity of ρ indicates that future losses are given more weight than current ones. The conditions on ℓ are identical to those in Assumption 2.1. Now let us consider a recursive formulation, to parallel the discrete time results in Section 2.2. The state path corresponding to a control a(t) is now
Similar to (2), we can also define the value function by
which is the minimal cost when the amount of tasks to be completed is x. We then have the following continuous time version of Theorem 2.1. where λ is a constant uniquely determined by the feasibility constraint
2. The optimal action a * (t) is decreasing in t. Moreover, C1. if ℓ ′ (0) = 0, then ℓ ′ (a * (t)) = −λe −ρt and a * (t) > 0 for all t; and C2. if ℓ ′ (0) > 0, then there is a finiteT such that a * (t) = 0 for all t T .
3. The value function F (x) is differentiable when x > 0, and it satisfies
with boundary condition F (0) = 0 and the optimal action a * at state x sat-
Equation (18) 
This is a continuous time version of (8). Furthermore, if a * is an interior solution in
, which is similar to (6) in the discrete case and gives an envelope-like condition between the value function and the loss function. The proof can be found in Appendix B.1
Example 4.1. Consider again the case ℓ(x) = x γ with γ > 1, previously considered in discrete time. Since ℓ ′ (0) = 0, Theorem 4.1 implies that a * (t) = (−λe −ρt /γ) 1/(γ−1) .
Using (19) to pin down λ and substituting into the solution gives a * (t) = θxe −θt . where θ := ρ γ − 1 .
Combining (16) and (22), we have
Now the optimal action can be expressed as a * = ρx * /(γ − 1), which is always proportional to the state. This relation demonstrates the trade-off between current loss and negatively discounted future losses. If γ is large, the agent will choose to complete a smaller portion of the remaining tasks each time because the loss function ℓ(a) grows rapidly with a. On the other hand, if ρ is large, the agent will try to complete the tasks faster because of the greater weight given to future losses indicated by e ρt . Plugging a * into (17) gives the value function
which is increasing in the amount of tasks x. Also, given x, the value function is increasing in the discount factor ρ. Although the agent will try to finish the tasks faster when ρ increases, minimal cost is still larger.
4.
2. An Application of the Continuous Time Theory. This section shows how the continuous time negative discount dynamic programming results can be applied to production chains and the theory of the firm. To begin, let us consider a version of the Coasian production chain model in Section 3.1 that is essentially parallel except that, as in Fally and Hillberry (2018) , there is a continuum of firms.
Firms are indexed by i ∈ Ê + , with i = 0 being the most downstream firm. Let a(i) be the range of tasks firm i chooses to implement and let p(i) be the price at which firm i sells the partially completed good. The cost of producing a(i) is c (a(i)). To finish the final product, a(·) has to satisfy ∞ 0 a(i)di = 1. Buyers bear transaction costs, so firm i pays τ di · p(i + di) for every unit purchased from firm i + di where τ > 0. Hence, the total cost for firm i is
In equilibrium, firms optimize and make zero profit, so any price function p(i) and optimal production a * (i) must satisfy 13 0 = c(a
To utilize our continuous time theory in Section 4.1, we define a new price function
, where x(i) corresponds to the stage 14 at which firm i sells its product.
Given differential equation (23), the equilibrium price function F , optimal production a * , and optimal path x * must satisfy 0 = c(a
where we use the fact that (x * ) ′ = −a * . Since we assume that initial inputs have zero cost, a boundary condition F (0) = 0 must also be satisfied.
13 Here we write the equilibrium conditions in differential form. 14 This is parallel to the state path (16) To find the equilibrium price and optimal production function, we first suppose that there is a social planner who minimizes the price of the final good p(0). By solving the differential equation (23), we have
where C is any constant. Therefore, the planner solves
which is the same as problem (MLC) withx = 1.
It follows from Theorem 4.1 that this problem has exactly one solution, the value function F (·) corresponding to the equilibrium price satisfies the differential equation (24) and the boundary condition F (0) = 0, and the optimal production a * (i)
is decreasing in i, suggesting that firm size is increasing in downstreamness. Moreover, by the remarks after Theorem 4.1, the solutions also satisfy F ′ (x * ) = c ′ (a * ), a similar condition to (11) in discrete time, which says that firms expands until the marginal cost of in-house production equals the marginal cost of purchasing from a supplier.
Extension: A Finite Horizon Problem
Next we consider a finite horizon version of the negative discount dynamic programming problem. We then show that this problem also has applications in the study of equilibria in production chains.
Negative Discount Optimization with a Finite Horizon.
The objective is to choose feasible action path a and a terminal date T to solve
The terminal cost function L is assumed to be increasing, twice continuously differentiable, and to satisfy L(t) → ∞ as t → ∞. Note that the time horizon itself is also a choice variable.
Theorem 5.1. Let Assumption 4.1 hold and suppose, in addition, that ℓ ′ (0) = 0.
Let λ and T * be constants and let
If λ and T * are such that
both hold, then a * solves (MLCF) and a * (t) is decreasing in t.
This theorem gives sufficient conditions for the control function to be optimal in the finite horizon problem (MLCF). Compared with Theorem 4.1, there is an additional condition involving L ′ (T * ) because the agent is also choosing the terminal date in this problem. An application that uses this theorem can be found in Section 5.2. (2018) provide a calibrated general equilibrium model of production across national boundaries. The production chain component is similar to the continuous-time model we analyzed in Section 4.2, although the mathematical result we apply corresponds to the finite horizon dynamic program from Theorem 5.1. This section gives details.
International Production Chains. Fally and Hillberry
In Fally and Hillberry (2018) , a production chain for a single final product consists of firms across multiple countries. In this section, we will restrict our attention to equilibria within one country that imports an intermediate good and exports a partially finished product after sequential production along the chain. Similar to the set-up in Section 4.2, firms face transaction costs and diseconomies of scope and are indexed by i ∈ Ê + . Given the import price B and the amount of production to be completedx, a social planner minimizes the price of the export good by choosing not only the amount each firm produces a(i), but also the total "number" of firms I in this country. Due to transaction costs, the price of the export good is
where the first part is the total cost along the chain and the second part is from the import price. The social planner's problem is thus To solve the planner's problem, we can directly apply Theorem 5.1, which offers sufficient conditions for the optimal solutions. We show in the appendix that all the conditions are satisfied for the parameterizations in Fally and Hillberry (2018) , and thus their proposed solution is indeed optimal. Theorem 5.1 complements their necessity results in that it provides a way to test the optimality of any solution. It is also able to deal with a wider range of functional forms beyond what is discussed above. A more general version of Theorem 5.1 can also be found in Appendix B.2.
Conclusion
This paper shows how competitive equilibria in a class of production chain models can be recovered as the solution to a dynamic programming problem. In particular, equilibrium prices in the production model are identified with the value function of a dynamic program, while competitive allocations of tasks across firms are identified with choices under the optimal policy. As a result, dynamic programming methods can be brought to bear on both the theory of the firm and the structure of production chains, providing new analytical and computational methods. The dynamic programming problem connected to production chains via the theory in this paper is of interest in its own right, since it provides a foundation for the theory of choice in an empirically relevant setting.
There are several avenues for more work on these topics. For example, in-house costs in the production chain models treated above are invariant with respect to upstreamness. This assumption could potentially be relaxed without breaking the link to dynamic programming, provided that the dynamic program is allowed to be nonstationary. Such issues are left for future research.
Appendix A. Proofs for Discrete Time Theory
Assumption 2.1 is imposed throughout.
Preliminary Results. We begin with several lemmas. The proof of the first lemma is trivial and hence omitted.
Lemma A.1. We have η > 0 if and only if ℓ
Lemma A.2. If {a t } is a solution to (ML), then {a t } is monotone decreasing and a T +1 = 0 if and only if a T η.
Proof. The first claim is obvious, because if {a t } is a solution to (ML) with a t < a t+1 , then, given that β > 1, swapping the values of these two points in the sequence will preserve the constraint while strictly decreasing total loss. Regarding the second claim, since {a t } is monotone decreasing, it suffices to check the case a T > 0. To this end, suppose to the contrary that {a t } is a solution to (ML) with 0 < a T < η and a T +1 > 0. Consider an alternative feasible sequence {â t } defined byâ T = a T + ǫ, a T +1 = a T +1 − ǫ andâ t = a t for other t. If we compare the values of these two sequences we get
The term inside the parenthesis converges to
where the first inequality follows from a T η, a T +1 > 0 and strict convexity of ℓ; and the second inequality is by the definition of η. We conclude that for ǫ sufficiently small, the difference
is positive, contradicting optimality.
Finally we check the claim a T +1 = 0 =⇒ a T η. Note that if η =x then there is nothing to prove, so we can and do take η <x. Seeking a contradiction, suppose instead that a T +1 = 0 and a T > η. Consider an alternative feasible sequence {â t } defined byâ T = a T − ǫ,â T +1 = ǫ andâ t = a t for other t. In this case we have
The term inside the parentheses converges to
where the final equality is due to η <x and Lemma A.1. Once again we conclude that for ǫ sufficiently small, the difference
contradicting optimality.
Our next result shows that if ℓ ′ (0) = 0 then any optimal sequence is strictly positive, while if ℓ ′ (0) > 0, then it has only finitely many positive terms.
On the other hand, if ℓ
such that a t > 0 if and only if t T .
Proof. Let {a t } is a solution to (ML). If ℓ ′ (0) = 0, then by Lemma A.1 we have η = 0, and hence, by Lemma A.2, a t = 0 implies a t−1 = 0. Since the sequence is decreasing, if follows that if a t = 0 for some t, then a t = 0 for all t. This violates the constraint. Hence a t > 0 for all t.
Regarding the second claim, if ℓ ′ (0) > 0 then η > 0 by Lemma A.1. Since t a t =x, we have a t → 0, and hence a t is less than η eventually. It follows that a t = 0 for some t. From the assumptionx > 0 we have a t > 0 for at least one t. The claim now follows from monotonicity.
Proposition A.4. A sequence {a t } ∈ Ê ∞ + satisfying ∞ t=0 a t =x is optimal if and only if it satisfies
Proof. Suppose first that {a t } ∈ Ê ∞ + is optimal. We claim that (26) holds. To show that this is true, it is enough to show that
Regarding (a), suppose that a T > η. In view of Lemma A.2 we have a T +1 > 0. As in the proof of Lemma A.2, if we define an alternative feasible sequence {â t } bŷ
The term inside the parentheses converges to −ℓ ′ (a T ) + βℓ ′ (a T +1 ). If this term is strictly positive, then choosing a small positive ǫ makes the difference between the sums positive, contradicting optimality. On the other hand, if this term is strictly negative, then choosing a small negative ǫ again makes the difference positive, contradicting optimality. Hence
Regarding claim (b), if a t η, then by Lemma A.2 we have a t+1 = 0. Hence ℓ ′ (a t+1 ) = 0. Moreover, by the definition of η the assumption a t η, we have ℓ ′ (a t ) β ℓ ′ (0). Hence (b) is also valid. This completes the proof that optimality implies (26).
Next we show sufficiency. To this end, let {a t } ∈ Ê ∞ + be a sequence satisfying (26) and t a t =x. Let {â t } be another sequence in Ê ∞ + with tâ t =x. Let x 0 :=x and x t+1 := x t − a t . Similarly, letx 0 :=x andx t+1 :=x t −â t . Let
It suffices to prove that lim T →∞ D T 0. To this end, observe that, by convexity of ℓ,
By simple rearrangement, and using the fact thatx 0 = x 0 and hence ℓ ′ (a 0 )(x 0 −x 0 ) = 0, we can write this bound as
Suppose for the moment that
In this case we have
Since this term clearly converges to zero, it remains only to show that (27) holds. To this end, first suppose that a t η. Then, by the definition of η, we have ℓ ′ (a t ) βℓ ′ (0), and hence, by (26), ℓ ′ (a t ) = βℓ ′ (a t+1 ). It follows that the term in (27) is zero. Next suppose that a t < η. Then ℓ ′ (a t ) < βℓ ′ (0), and hence, by (26),
. Since ℓ ′ is strictly increasing, this gives a t+1 = 0. Repeating the argument at t + 1 instead of t gives a t+2 = 0, and continuing in this way, a t+j = 0 for all j 1. This implies that x t+k = x t+1 for all k 1. From (26) we know that t a t =x, and hence x t → 0. It now follows that x t+1 = 0. Applying (26) again yields ℓ ′ (a t ) − βℓ ′ (a t+1 ) 0, and we conclude once again that (27) is valid.
Proposition A.5. There exists exactly one feasible sequence {a t } satisfying (26).
Proof. Let h be the function associated with the Euler equation in (26). That is,
Evidently h is continuous and strictly increasing, and hence so is its t-th self-iterate h t . For each given x ∈ Ê + , the sequence {a t (x)} defined by a t (x) := h t (x) satisfies the Euler equation in (26). Varying x over Ê + gives the set of all sequences {a t } in Ê ∞ + that satisfy the Euler equation. We need to show that one and only one of these sequences sums tox.
To this end, let H(x)
, where h 0 (x) := x. Using the fact that h t is continuous and strictly increasing combined with the monotone convergence theorem, it is trivial to show that H is both left-and right-continuous at any given x. Hence H is a continuous function. Evidently H(x) x and H(0) x. It follows from the intermediate value theorem that there exists ans ∈ [0,x] such that H(s) =x. Since H is strictly increasing, there is no other point x ∈ [0,x] that satisfies this equality.
Hence if we take a 0 :=s and a t := h t (s), we obtain the unique sequence in Ê ∞ + that satisfies the two conditions in (26).
A Recursive Representation. Next we turn to the recursive representation. Throughout the proofs, we regularly use the alternative expression for T given by
Also, given f ∈ F , define
and
These functions are clearly well-defined, unique and single-valued. We call π f the f -greedy function. Let π := π F be the F -greedy function.
Proof. Pick any f ∈ F . First we show that σ f (x 1 ) σ f (x 2 ). To simplify notation, let y i := σ f (x i ). Suppose instead that y 1 > y 2 . We aim to show that, in this case,
which contradicts the definition of y 2 . 15 To establish (30), observe that y 1 is optimal at x 1 and y 2 < y 1 , so βf (y 1 ) + ℓ(x 1 − y 1 ) < βf (y 2 ) + ℓ(x 1 − y 2 ). Hence
Since ℓ is strictly convex and y 2 < y 1 , we have ℓ(x 2 − y 1 ) − ℓ(x 1 − y 1 ) < ℓ(x 2 − y 2 ) − ℓ(x 1 − y 2 ). Combining this with the last inequality yields (30).
Next we show that a 1 a 2 , where a 1 := π f (x 1 ) and a 2 := π f (x 2 ). To induce the contradiction, suppose that a 2 < a 1 . As a result, we have 0 a 2 < a 1 x 1 , and hence a 2 was available when a 1 was chosen. Therefore,
where the strict inequality is due to the fact that minimizers are unique. Rearranging and adding βf (x 2 − a 1 ) to both sides gives
Given that f is convex and a 2 < a 1 , we have
Combining this with the last inequality, we obtain βf (x 2 − a 1 ) + ℓ(a 1 ) < βf (x 2 − a 2 ) + ℓ(a 2 ), contradicting optimality of a 2 .
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To complete the proof of Lemma A.6, we also need to show that σ f (x 2 ) − σ f (x 1 ) x 2 − x 1 , and similarly for π f . Starting with the first case, we have
As shown above, π f (x 1 ) π f (x 2 ), so σ f (x 2 ) − σ f (x 1 ) x 2 − x 1 , as was to be shown. The corresponding proof for π p is obtained in the same way, by reversing the roles of σ p and π p . This concludes the proof of Lemma A.6.
Lemma A.7. If f ∈ F , then σ f (x) = 0 if and only if x η.
15 Note that y 1 < x 1 x 2 , so y 1 is available when y 2 is chosen. 16 Note that 0 a 1 x 1 x 2 , so a 1 is available when a 2 is chosen.
Proof. First suppose that x η. Seeking a contradiction, suppose there exists a y ∈ (0, x] such that ℓ(x − y) + βf (y) < ℓ(x). Since f ∈ F we have f (y) ℓ ′ (0)y and hence βf (y) βℓ
Since x η, this implies that βf (y) ℓ ′ (x)y. Combining these inequalities gives
, contradicting convexity of ℓ.
Now suppose that σ f (x) = 0. We claim that x η, or, equivalently ℓ ′ (x) βℓ ′ (0).
To prove ℓ ′ (x) βℓ ′ (0), observe that since f ∈ F we have f (y) ℓ(y), and hence
It follows that ℓ(x) − ℓ(x − y) y βℓ(y) y for all y x.
Taking the limit gives ℓ
Proof. By Lemma A.6, π f is increasing, and hence if
Proof. Let f ∈ F . First we show that ℓ ′ (0)x T f (x) ℓ(x) for all x ∈ Ê + . To see that T f ℓ, fix x ∈ Ê + and observe that, since f ∈ F implies f (0) = 0, we
any such x. Using the assumption that f ∈ F , we have T f (x) min y x {ℓ(x − y) + βℓ ′ (0)y}. By β > 1 and convexity of ℓ, we have
Next we turn to continuity, monotonicity and convexity of T f (recalling that each f ∈ F is assumed to have these properties). The proof that T f is convex is analogous to the standard argument that concavity (in the max case) is preserved under iteration by the Bellman operator (see, e.g., Stokey and Lucas (1989) , Theorem 4.8) and hence omitted. To see that T f is monotone increasing and continuous, it suffices to observe that T f (x) = ℓ(π f (x)) + βf (σ f (x)), and refer to the properties of π f and σ f obtained in Lemma A.6.
Regarding uniqueness, let f and g be two fixed points of T in F . Suppose they differ at some x ∈ Ê + . Choose k such that kη x. In view of Lemma A.10, we
Proof. Fix f ∈ F and x 0 > 0. By Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979) , to show that T f is differentiable at x 0 it suffices to exhibit an open neighborhood U ∋ x 0 and a function w : U → Ê such that w is convex, differentiable, satisfies w(x 0 ) = T f (x 0 ) and dominates T f on U. To this end, observe that by Lemma A.8, we have
It is straightforward to check that w is convex and differentiable on U, with w(x 0 ) = T f (x 0 ) and w(x) T f (x) whenever x ∈ U. As a result, T f is differentiable at x 0 with (T f )
Lemma A.13. If f ∈ F , then T f is strictly convex.
Proof. The proof is elementary and hence omitted.
Let f * be the unique fixed point of T in F , existence and uniqueness of which was shown above. Let π = π f * be the f * -greedy function, and let σ(x) := x − π(x). Let σ t be the t-th composition of σ with itself.
Lemma A.14. Together, π and σ satisfy
Proof. If x = 0 the result is trivial, so assume instead that x > 0. Recall that π(x) = arg min 0 a x {ℓ(a) + βf * (x − a)}, and hence, by the first order condition,
0 with equality whenever π(x) > 0. Rearranging, using the fact that f * = T f * and the result in Lemma A.12, we can write this as
) with equality when π(x) > 0.
Consider first the case where x > η. In this case, by Lemma A.8, we have π(x) η > 0. Hence, by (32), we have ℓ ′ (π(σ(x))) = ℓ ′ (π(x))/β, and it remains only to
Completing the Discrete Time Proofs. We can now complete the claims from Section 2.
Proof of Theorem 2.1. Part 1 of Theorem 2.1 follows from Lemma A.16. Part 2 follows from Lemmas A.10-A.16. Part 3 follows from Lemma A.6 and the discussion immediately above. Part 4 is due to Lemma A.12, applied to f = F . Part 5 follows from Lemma A.15. Part 5 is due to Proposition A.4.
Proof of Theorem 2.2. Sufficiency. Let x * 0 = 1 and x * t = x * t−1 − a * t−1 for t 1. Let {a t } be any feasible sequence. Let x 0 = 1 and x t = x t−1 − a t−1 . It suffices to prove that
Since ℓ is convex, we have
.
Since βℓ ′ (a * t+1 ) = ℓ ′ (a * t ), the summation is zero and
Since {a t } and {a * t } are feasible, x T +1 and x * T +1 go to zero when T → ∞. Therefore, D 0.
Existence and Uniqueness. Since {a * t } is feasible and satisfies βℓ
where (ℓ ′ ) −1 is well defined on [0, lim x→∞ ℓ ′ (x)] because ℓ is increasing, strictly convex, and ℓ ′ (0) = 0. Hence, g is well defined on Ê + and g(a * 0 ) is continuous and strictly increasing in a * 0 . Since g(0) = 0 and g(1) > 1, there exists a unique a *
is feasible, a * t > 0 for all t, and {a * t } is strictly decreasing. That {a * t } is an optimal solution then follows from the sufficiency part. Since ℓ is strictly convex, the solution is unique.
Necessity. Since we have pinned down a unique solution of (ML) which satisfies βℓ ′ (a * t+1 ) = ℓ ′ (a * t ), the condition is also necessary.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. We must verify that (F, a * ) satisfies Definition 3.1. We first consider the case of ℓ ′ (0) > 0. By Theorem 2.1, the value function F is a solution to the Bellman equation (3), and hence satisfies
By the same theorem, it lies in the class F of increasing, convex and continuous
with {x i } as the optimal state process (see Part 5 of Theorem 2.1) we have,
We need to show that 1-3 of Definition 3.1 hold when p = F and v = a * . Part 1 is immediate because F ∈ F and all functions in F must have this property, while Part 2 follows directly from (34). To see that Part 3 of Definition 3.1 also holds, let b i = x i , where x i is as defined in Part 5 of Theorem 2.1. By the definition of the state process, the sequence {b i } then corresponds to the downstream boundaries of a set of firms obeying task allocation {a * i }. The profits of firm i are
. By (35) and b i = x i , we have Π i = 0 for all i. Hence Part 3 of Definition 3.1 also holds, as was to be shown.
If ℓ ′ (0) = 0, part 1 follows from the definition of the value function (2). By Theorem 2.2, for any t with 0 t 1, there exists a unique optimal allocation {a * t,j } such that F (t) = j β j ℓ(a * t,j ), and j a * t,j = t. Since {s − t, a * t,0 , a * t,1 , . . .} is a feasible allocation at stage s with t s 1, part 2 follows from the definition of the value function. To see part 3, let b 0 = 1 and
Hence, Π i = 0 for all i.
Appendix B. Proofs for Continuous Time Theory
Assumption 4.1 is imposed throughout. B.1. Proof of Theorem 4.1. In this section, we consider a relatively more general problem:
subject tȯ
Throughout the appendix, we assume that f and g are continuously differentiable with respect to x, a, and t, and a(·) is piecewise continuous. Define the Hamiltonian by
and denote the partial derivatives of H by H x , H a , and H λ . We have the following theorem.
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Theorem B.1. Consider problem (36) subject to (37). Assume there exists (x * (t), a * (t))
such that the cost function is finite. Suppose there exists (x * (t), a * (t)) satisfying (37) and continuously differentiable λ(t) such that the following conditions hold: 1.λ(t) = −H x (x * (t), a * (t), λ(t), t) except at points of discontinuity of a * (t);
2. H(x * (t), a * (t), λ(t), t) = max a∈U H(x * (t), a, λ(t), t) for all t;
3. H is jointly concave in x and a; 4. U is convex. Then (x * (t), a * (t)) is a solution to problem (36). Moreover, if H is strictly concave in x and a, (x * (t), a * (t)) is a unique solution.
Our continuous time problem (MLC) fits in this framework if we let g(t, x(t), a(t)) = e ρt ℓ(a(t)), f (t, x(t), a(t)) = −a(t), U = [0, ∞), x 0 =x > 0, and x 1 = 0. The
Hamiltonian is thus
H(x(t), a(t), λ(t), t) = −λ(t)a(t) − e ρt ℓ(a(t)).
It is easy to check that all the conditions in Theorem B.1 are satisfied as long as there exists a constant λ satisfying (18) and (19).
We shall prove that such λ indeed exists and is unique when ℓ ′ (0) = 0. Since ℓ is increasing, strictly convex, and continuously differentiable, h := (ℓ ′ ) −1 is well defined on an interval [0, M) of Ê + , where M = lim a→∞ ℓ ′ (a). Moreover, h is continuous, 17 For more general versions of this sufficiency theorem, see (Acemoglu, 2008 , Chapter 7), Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1977) , or Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1986) .
strictly increasing, and ranges from zero to infinity. When −λe −ρt falls into the domain of h, (18) implies that a * (t; λ) = h(−λe −ρt ).
Because of the properties of h, ∞ 0 a * (t; λ)dt is strictly increasing and ranges from zero to infinity. Therefore, there exists a unique λ such that (18) and (19) hold. It then follows from Theorem B.1 that a * in (18) is the unique solution to problem (MLC). Part 1 of Theorem 4.1 for ℓ ′ (0) > 0 can be proved in a similar way and we leave it to the reader.
When ℓ ′ (0) = 0, −λe −ρt is always in the domain of h. Therefore, a * is given by (40) and is decreasing and strictly positive. When ℓ ′ (0) > 0, 0 is not in the domain of h;
(18) implies that a * will become zero when t is large enough. This proves part 2 of 
x(s) = f (s, x(s), a(s)), x(t) = x, lim s→∞ x(s) = x 1 , and a(s) ∈ U ⊂ Ê ∀s.
We have the following necessary conditions for optimality 18 .
Theorem B.2. Suppose V (t, x) is differentiable with respect to t and x and there exists (x * (t), a * (t)) that solves problem (36). Then V is the solution to the HJB equation − V t (t, x) = inf a∈U {g(t, x, a) + V x (t, x)f (t, x, u)}
with boundary condition lim t→∞ V (t, x(t)) = 0 and (x * (t), a * (t)) satisfies −V t (t, x * (t)) = inf a∈U {g(t, x * (t), a) + V x (t, x * (t))f (t, x * (t), a)} = g(t, x * (t), a * (t)) + V x (t, x * (t))f (t, x * (t), a * (t)).
For discounted optimal control problems, if we can write g(t, x, a) = e ρt g(x, a) and f (t, x, a) = f (x, a), we can define the stationary value function by F (x) := V (0, x). Then we have a stationary version of (42):
− ρF (x) = inf a∈U {g(x, a) + F ′ (x)f (x, a)} .
The differentiability of F follows from Theorem 7.17 of Acemoglu (2008) . From part 1 we know that an optimal control exists, so we can apply Theorem B.2. This concludes part 3 of Theorem 4.1. 
B.2. Production Chains in Continuous
x(t) = f (t, x(t), a(t)), x(0) = x 0 , x(T ) = x 1 , and a(t) ∈ U ⊂ Ê ∀t.
Assume L is twice continuously differentiable and L(t) → ∞ as t → ∞. Define the new Hamiltonian by H(x(t), a(t), λ(t), t) = λ(t)f (t, x(t), a(t)) − g(t, x(t), a(t)) −L(t).
Since L(T ) can become arbitrarily large, we can find a largeT and choose T from [0,T ] without loss of generality. We have the following sufficiency theorem.
Theorem B.3 (Seierstad (1984) ). Consider problem (45) subject to (46) with U bounded. Suppose for each δ T there exists (x δ (t), a δ (t)) satisfying (46) and continuously differentiable λ δ (t) such that the following conditions hold: 1.λ δ (t) = −H x (x δ (t), a δ (t), λ δ (t), t) except at points of discontinuity of a δ (t); 2. H(x δ (t), a δ (t), λ δ (t), t) = max a∈U H(x δ (t), a, λ δ (t), t) for all t; 3. H is jointly concave in x and a; 4. U is convex. Moreover, suppose there is no other λ δ such that the above conditions hold. Then, if there exists T * such that H(x δ (δ), a δ (δ), λ δ (δ), δ) 0 for δ < T * and H(x δ (δ), a δ (δ), λ δ (δ), δ) 0 for δ > T * . Then (x T * (·), a T * (·), T * ) is a solution to problem (45).
In problem (MLCF), g(t, x, a) = e ρt ℓ(a), f (t, x, a) = −a, and ℓ ′ (0) = 0. Assume L(t) = Be ρt with B > 0 as in Fally and Hillberry (2018) . Then, for any fixed δ, we have a δ (t) = h(−λ δ e −ρt ) where λ δ satisfies that δ 0 a δ (t)dt =x. Since for λ = λ δ , a that minimizes H(x δ (t), a, λ, t) satisfies a = h(−λe −ρt ) = a δ , there is no other λ δ such that all the conditions hold. Moreover, we have H(x δ (δ), a δ (δ), λ δ (δ), δ) = −λ δ a δ (δ) − e ρδ ℓ(a δ (δ)) − ρBe h(−λ δ e −ρt )dt =x. Therefore, H(x δ (δ), a δ (δ), λ δ (δ), δ) is strictly decreasing in δ. If we can find T * such that H(x T * (T * ), a T * (T * ), λ T * (T * ), T * ) = 0, then (x T * (·), a T * (·), T * ) is optimal. Therefore, the solutions given in Fally and Hillberry (2018) are optimal.
